Unmasking Jane Brody’s “A Positive Outlook May Be Good for Your Health” in The New York Times

A recipe for coercing ill people with positive psychology pseudoscience in the New York Times

  • Judging by the play she gets in social media and the 100s of comments on her articles in the New York Times, Jane Brody has a successful recipe for using positive psychology pseudoscience to bolster down-home advice you might’ve gotten from your grandmother.
  • Her recipe might seem harmless enough, but her articles are directed at people struggling with chronic and catastrophic physical illnesses. She offers them advice.
  • The message is that persons with physical illness should engage in self-discipline, practice positive psychology exercises – or else they are threatening their health and shortening their lives.
  • People struggling with physical illness have enough to do already. The admonition they individually and collectively should do more -they should become more self-disciplined- is condescending and presumptuous.
  • Jane Brody’s carrot is basically a stick. The implied threat is simply coercive: that people with chronic illness are not doing what they can to improve the physical health unless they engage in these exercises.
  • It takes a careful examination Jane Brody’s sources to discover that the “scientific basis” for this positive psychology advice is quite weak. In many instances it is patently junk, pseudoscience.
  • The health benefits claimed for positivity are unfounded.
  • People with chronic illness are often desperate or simply vulnerable to suggestions that they can and should do more.  They are being misled by this kind of article in what is supposed to be the trusted source of a quality news outlet, The New York Times, not The Daily News.
  • There is a sneaky, ill-concealed message that persons with chronic illness will obtain wondrous benefits by just adopting a positive attitude – even a hint that cancer patients will live longer.

In my blog post about positive psychology and health, I try to provide  tools so that consumers can probe for themselves the usually false and certainly exaggerated claims that are being showered on them.

However, in the case of Jane Brody’s articles, we will see that the task is difficult because she draws on a selective sampling of the literature in which researchers generate junk self-promotional claims.

That’s a general problem with the positive psychology “science” literature, but the solution for journalists like Jane Brody is to seek independent evaluation of claims from outside the positive psychology community. Journalists, did you hear that message?

The article, along with its 100s of comments from readers, is available here:

A Positive Outlook May Be Good for Your Health by Jane E.Brody

The article starts with some clichéd advice about being positive. Brody seems to be on the side of the autonomy of her  readers. She makes seemingly derogatory comments  that the advice is “cockeyed optimism” [Don’t you love that turn of phrase? I’m sure to borrow it in the future]

“Look on the sunny side of life.”

“Turn your face toward the sun, and the shadows will fall behind you.”

“Every day may not be good, but there is something good in every day.”

“See the glass as half-full, not half-empty.”

Researchers are finding that thoughts like these, the hallmarks of people sometimes called “cockeyed optimists,” can do far more than raise one’s spirits. They may actually improve health and extend life.

See?  The clever putdown of this advice was just a rhetorical device, just a set up for what follows. Very soon Brody is delivering some coercive pseudoscientific advice, backed by the claim that “there is no longer any doubt” and that the links between positive thinking and health benefits are “indisputable.”

There is no longer any doubt that what happens in the brain influences what happens in the body. When facing a health crisis, actively cultivating positive emotions can boost the immune system and counter depression. Studies have shown an indisputable link between having a positive outlook and health benefits like lower blood pressure, less heart disease, better weight control [Emphasis added.].

I found the following passage particularly sneaky and undermining of people with cancer.

Even when faced with an incurable illness, positive feelings and thoughts can greatly improve one’s quality of life. Dr. Wendy Schlessel Harpham, a Dallas-based author of several books for people facing cancer, including “Happiness in a Storm,” was a practicing internist when she learned she had non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, a cancer of the immune system, 27 years ago. During the next 15 years of treatments for eight relapses of her cancer, she set the stage for happiness and hope, she says, by such measures as surrounding herself with people who lift her spirits, keeping a daily gratitude journal, doing something good for someone else, and watching funny, uplifting movies. Her cancer has been in remission now for 12 years.

“Fostering positive emotions helped make my life the best it could be,” Dr. Harpham said. “They made the tough times easier, even though they didn’t make any difference in my cancer cells.”

Sure, Jane Brody is careful to avoid the explicit claim the positive attitude somehow is connected to the cancer being in remission for 12 years, but the implication is there. Brody pushes the advice with a hint of the transformation available to cancer patients, only if they follow the advice.

After all, Jane Brody had just earlier asserted that positive attitude affects the immune system and this well-chosen example happens to be a cancer of the immune system.

Jane Brody immediately launches into a description of a line of research conducted by a positive psychology group at Northwestern University and University of California San Francisco.

Taking her cue from the investigators, Brody blurs the distinction between findings based in correlational studies and the results of intervention studies in which patients actually practiced positive psychology exercises.

People with new diagnoses of H.I.V. infection who practiced these skills carried a lower load of the virus, were more likely to take their medication correctly, and were less likely to need antidepressants to help them cope with their illness.

But Brody sins as a journalist are worse than that. With a great deal of difficulty, I have chased her claims back into the literature. I found some made up facts.

In my literature search, I could find only one study from these investigators that seemed directly related to these claims. The mediocre retrospective correlational study was mainly focused on use of psychostimulants, but it included a crude 6-item summary measure  of positive states of mind.

The authors didn’t present the results in a simple way that allows direct independent examination of whether indeed positive affect is related to other outcomes in any simple fashion. They did not allow check of simple correlations needed to determine whether their measure was not simply a measure of depressive symptoms turned on its head. They certainly had the data, but did not report it. Instead, they present some multivariate analyses that do not show impressive links. Any direct links to viral load are not shown and presumably are not there, although the investigators tested statistically for them. Technically speaking, I would write off the findings to measurement and specification error, certainly not worthy of reporting in The New York Times.

Less technically speaking, Brody is leading up to using HIV as an exemplar illness where cultivating positivity can do so much. But if this study is worth anything at all, it is to illustrate that even correlationally, positive affect is not related to much, other than – no surprise – alternative measures of positive affect.

Brody then goes on to describe in detail an intervention study. You’d never know from her description that her source of information is not a report of the results of the intervention study, but a promissory protocol that supposedly describes how the intervention study was going to be done.

I previously blogged about this protocol. At first, I thought it was praiseworthy that a study of a positive psychology intervention for health had even complied with the requirement that studies be preregistered and have a protocol available. Most such studies do not, but they are supposed to do that. In plain English, protocols are supposed to declare ahead of time what researchers are going to do and precisely how they are going to evaluate whether an intervention works. That is because, notoriously, researchers are inclined to say later they were really trying to do something else and to pick another outcome that makes the intervention look best.

But then I got corrected by James Heathers on Facebook. Duh, he had looked at the date the protocol was published.

He pointed out that this protocol was actually published years after collection of data had begun. The researchers already had a lot to peek at. Rather than identifying just a couple of variables on which the investigators were prepared to stake their claim the intervention was affected, the protocol listed 25 variables that would be examined as outcomes (!) in order to pick one or two.

So I updated what I said in my earlier blog. I pointed out that the published protocol was misleading. It was posted after the fact of the researchers being able to see how their study was unfolding and to change their plains accordingly.  The vagueness of the protocol gave the authors lots of wiggle room for selectively reporting and hyping their findings with the confirmation bias. They would later take advantage of this when they actually published the results of their study.

The researchers studied 159 people who had recently learned they had H.I.V. and randomly assigned them to either a five-session positive emotions training course or five sessions of general support. Fifteen months past their H.I.V. diagnosis, those trained in the eight skills maintained higher levels of positive feelings and fewer negative thoughts related to their infection.

Brody is not being accurate here. When the  authors finally got around to publishing the results, they told a very different story if you probe carefully. Even with the investigators doing a lot of spinning, they showed null results, no effects for the intervention. Appearances the contrary were created by the investigators ignoring what they actually reported in their tables. If you go to my earlier blog post, I point this out in detail, so you can see for yourself.

Brody goes on to describe the regimen that was not shown in the published study validation to be effective.

An important goal of the training is to help people feel happy, calm and satisfied in the midst of a health crisis. Improvements in their health and longevity are a bonus. Each participant is encouraged to learn at least three of the eight skills and practice one or more each day. The eight skills are:

■ Recognize a positive event each day.

■ Savor that event and log it in a journal or tell someone about it.

■ Start a daily gratitude journal.

■ List a personal strength and note how you used it.

■ Set an attainable goal and note your progress.

■ Report a relatively minor stress and list ways to reappraise the event positively.

■ Recognize and practice small acts of kindness daily.

■ Practice mindfulness, focusing on the here and now rather than the past or future.

For chrissakes, this is a warmed over version of Émile Coué de la Châtaigneraie’s autosuggestion “Every day in every way, I’m getting better and better. Surely, contemporary positive psychology’s science of health can do better than that. To Coué’s credit, he gave away his advice for free. He did not charge for his coaching, even if he was giving away something for which he had no evidence would improve people’s physical health.

Dr. Moskowitz said she was inspired by observations that people with AIDS, Type 2 diabetes and other chronic illnesses lived longer if they demonstrated positive emotions. She explained, “The next step was to see if teaching people skills that foster positive emotions can have an impact on how well they cope with stress and their physical health down the line.”

She listed as the goals improving patients’ quality of life, enhancing adherence to medication, fostering healthy behaviors, and building personal resources that result in increased social support and broader attention to the good things in life.

Let me explain why I am offended here. None of these activities have been shown to improve the health of persons with newly diagnosed HIV. It’s reasonable to assume that newly diagnosed persons have a lot with which to contend. It’s a bad time to give them advice to clutter their life with activities that will not make a difference in their health.

The published study was able to recruit and retain a sample of persons with newly diagnosed HIV because it paid them well to keep coming. I’ve worked with this population before, in a study aiming at helping them solve specific practical problems that that they said got in the way of their adherence.

Many persons with newly diagnosed HIV are low income and are unemployed or marginally employed. They will enroll in studies to get the participant fees. When I lived in the San Francisco Bay area, I recall one patient telling a recruiter from UCSF that he was too busy and unable to make a regular visit to the medical center for the intervention, but he would be willing to accept being in the study if he was assigned to the control group. It did not involve attending intervention sessions and would give him a little cash.

Based on my clinical and research experience, I don’t believe that such patients would regularly show up for this kind of useless positive psychology treatment without getting paid. Paticularly if they were informed of the actual results of this misrepresented study.

Gregg De Meza, a 56-year-old architect in San Francisco who learned he was infected with H.I.V. four years ago, told me that learning “positivity” skills turned his life around. He said he felt “stupid and careless” about becoming infected and had initially kept his diagnosis a secret.

“When I entered the study, I felt like my entire world was completely unraveling,” he said. “The training reminded me to rely on my social network, and I decided to be honest with my friends. I realized that to show your real strength is to show your weakness. No pun intended, it made me more positive, more compassionate, and I’m now healthier than I’ve ever been.”

I object to this argument by quotes-from-an-unrepresentative-patient. The intervention did not have the intended effect, and it is misleading to find somebody who claim to turn their life around.

Jane Brody proceeds with some more fake facts.

In another study among 49 patients with Type 2 diabetes, an online version of the positive emotions skills training course was effective in enhancing positivity and reducing negative emotions and feelings of stress. Prior studies showed that, for people with diabetes, positive feelings were associated with better control of blood sugar, an increase in physical activity and healthy eating, less use of tobacco and a lower risk of dying.

The study was so small and underpowered, aside from being methodologically flawed, that even if such effects were actually present, most of the time they would be missed because the study did not have enough patients to achieve significance.

In a pilot study of 39 women with advanced breast cancer, Dr. Moskowitz said an online version of the skills training decreased depression among them. The same was true with caregivers of dementia patients.

“None of this is rocket science,” Dr. Moskowitz said. “I’m just putting these skills together and testing them in a scientific fashion.”

It’s not rocket science, it’s misleading hogwash.

In a related study of more than 4,000 people 50 and older published last year in the Journal of Gerontology, Becca Levy and Avni Bavishi at the Yale School of Public Health demonstrated that having a positive view of aging can have a beneficial influence on health outcomes and longevity. Dr. Levy said two possible mechanisms account for the findings. Psychologically, a positive view can enhance belief in one’s abilities, decrease perceived stress and foster healthful behaviors. Physiologically, people with positive views of aging had lower levels of C-reactive protein, a marker of stress-related inflammation associated with heart disease and other illnesses, even after accounting for possible influences like age, health status, sex, race and education than those with a negative outlook. They also lived significantly longer.

This is even deeper into the woo. Give me a break, Jane Brody. Stop misleading people with chronic illness with false claims and fake facts. Adopting these attitudes will not prevent dementia.

Don’t believe me? I previously debunked these patently false claims in detail. You can see my critique here.

Here is what the original investigators claimed about Alzheimer’s:

We believe it is the stress generated by the negative beliefs about aging that individuals sometimes internalize from society that can result in pathological brain changes,” said Levy. “Although the findings are concerning, it is encouraging to realize that these negative beliefs about aging can be mitigated and positive beliefs about aging can be reinforced, so that the adverse impact is not inevitable.”

I exposed some analysis of voodoo statistics on which this claim is based. I concluded:

The authors develop their case that stress is a significant cause of Alzheimer’s disease with reference to some largely irrelevant studies by others, but depend on a preponderance of studies that they themselves have done with the same dubious small samples and dubious statistical techniques. Whether you do a casual search with Google scholar or a more systematic review of the literature, you won’t find stress processes of the kind the authors invoke among the usual explanations of the development of the disease.

Basically, the authors are arguing that if you hold views of aging like “Old people are absent-minded” or “Old people cannot concentrate well,” you will experience more stress as you age, and this will accelerate development of Alzheimer’s disease. They then go on to argue that because these attitudes are modifiable, you can take control of your risk for Alzheimer’s by adopting a more positive view of aging and aging people

Nonsense, utter nonsense.

Let chronically ill people and those facing cancer adopt any attitude is comfortable or natural for them. It’s a bad time to ask for change, particularly when there isn’t any promised benefit in improved health or prolonged life.

Rather than Jane Brody’s recipe for positive psychology improving your health, I strongly prefer Lilia Downe’s  La Cumbia Del Mole.

It is great on chicken. If it does not extend your life, It will give you some moments of happiness, but you will have to adjust the spices to your personal taste.

I will soon be offering e-books providing skeptical looks at positive psychology, as well as mindfulness. As in this blog post, I will take claims I find in the media and trace them back to the scientific studies on which they are based. I will show you what I see so you can see it too.

 Sign up at my new website to get advance notice of the forthcoming e-books and web courses, as well as upcoming blog posts at this and other blog sites. You can even advance order one or all of the e-books.

 Lots to see at CoyneoftheRealm.com. Come see…

Danish RCT of cognitive behavior therapy for whatever ails your physician about you

I was asked by a Danish journalist to examine a randomized controlled trial (RCT) of cognitive behavior therapy (CBT) for functional somatic symptoms. I had not previously given the study a close look.

I was dismayed by how highly problematic the study was in so many ways.

I doubted that the results of the study showed any benefits to the patients or have any relevance to healthcare.

I then searched and found the website for the senior author’s clinical offerings.  I suspected that the study was a mere experimercial or marketing effort of the services he offered.

Overall, I think what I found hiding in plain sight has broader relevance to scrutinizing other studies claiming to evaluate the efficacy of CBT for what are primarily physical illnesses, not psychiatric disorders. Look at the other RCTs. I am confident you will find similar problems. But then there is the bigger picture…

[A controversial assessment ahead? You can stop here and read the full text of the RCT  of the study and its trial registration before continuing with my analysis.]

Schröder A, Rehfeld E, Ørnbøl E, Sharpe M, Licht RW, Fink P. Cognitive–behavioural group treatment for a range of functional somatic syndromes: randomised trial. The British Journal of Psychiatry. 2012 Apr 13:bjp-p.

A summary overview of what I found:

 The RCT:

  • Was unblinded to patients, interventionists, and to the physicians continuing to provide routine care.
  • Had a grossly unmatched, inadequate control/comparison group that leads to any benefit from nonspecific (placebo) factors in the trial counting toward the estimated efficacy of the intervention.
  • Relied on subjective self-report measures for primary outcomes.
  • With such a familiar trio of design flaws, even an inert homeopathic treatment would be found effective, if it were provided with the same positive expectations and support as the CBT in this RCT. [This may seem a flippant comment that reflects on my credibility, not the study. But please keep reading to my detailed analysis where I back it up.]
  • The study showed an inexplicably high rate of deterioration in both treatment and control group. Apparent improvement in the treatment group might only reflect less deterioration than in the control group.
  • The study is focused on unvalidated psychiatric diagnoses being applied to patients with multiple somatic complaints, some of whom may not yet have a medical diagnosis, but most clearly had confirmed physical illnesses.

But wait, there is more!

  • It’s not CBT that was evaluated, but a complex multicomponent intervention in which what was called CBT is embedded in a way that its contribution cannot be evaluated.

The “CBT” did not map well on international understandings of the assumptions and delivery of CBT. The complex intervention included weeks of indoctrination of the patient with an understanding of their physical problems that incorporated simplistic pseudoscience before any CBT was delivered. We focused on goals imposed by a psychiatrist that didn’t necessarily fit with patients’ sense of their most pressing problems and the solutions.

OMGAnd the kicker.

  • The authors switched primary outcomes – reconfiguring the scoring of their subjective self-report measures years into the trial, based on a peeking at the results with the original scoring.

Investigators have a website which is marketing services. Rather than a quality contribution to the literature, this study can be seen as an experimercial doomed to bad science and questionable results from before the first patient was enrolled. An undeclared conflict of interest in play? There is another serious undeclared conflict of interest for one of the authors.

For the uninformed and gullible, the study handsomely succeeds as an advertisement for the investigators’ services to professionals and patients.

Personally, I would be indignant if a primary care physician tried to refer me or friend or family member to this trial. In the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, I assume that people around me who complain of physical symptoms have legitimate physical concerns. If they do not yet have a confirmed diagnosis, it serves little purpose to stop the probing and refer them to psychiatrists. This trial operates with an anachronistic Victorian definition of psychosomatic condition.

something is rotten in the state of DenmarkBut why should we care about a patently badly conducted trial with switched outcomes? Is it only a matter of something being rotten in the state of Denmark? Aside from the general impact on the existing literature concerning CBT for somatic conditions, results of this trial  were entered into a Cochrane review of nonpharmacological interventions for medically unexplained symptoms. I previously complained about one of the authors of this RCT also being listed as an author on another Cochrane review protocol. Prior to that, I complained to Cochrane  about this author’s larger research group influencing a decision to include switched outcomes in another Cochrane review.  A lot of us rightfully depend heavily on the verdict of Cochrane reviews for deciding best evidence. That trust is being put into jeopardy.

Detailed analysis

1.This is an unblinded trial, a particularly weak methodology for examining whether a treatment works.

The letter that alerted physicians to the trial had essentially encouraged them to refer patients they were having difficulty managing.

‘Patients with a long-term illness course due to medically unexplained or functional somatic symptoms who may have received diagnoses like fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue syndrome, whiplash associated disorder, or somatoform disorder.

Patients and the physicians who referred them subsequently got feedback about to which group patients were assigned, either routine care or what was labeled as CBT. This information could have had a strong influence on the outcomes that were reported, particularly for the patients left in routine care.

Patients’ learning that they did not get assigned to the intervention group was undoubtedly disappointing and demoralizing. The information probably did nothing to improve the positive expectations and support available to patients in routine. This could have had a nocebo effect. The feedback may have contributed to the otherwise  inexplicably high rates of subjective deterioration [to be noted below] reported by patients left in the routine care condition. In contrast, the authors’ disclosure that patients had been assigned to the intervention group undoubtedly boosted the morale of both patients and physicians and also increased the gratitude of the patients. This would be reflected in the responses to the subjective outcome measures.

The gold standard alternative to an unblinded trial is a double-blind, placebo-controlled trial in which neither providers, nor patients, nor even the assessors rating outcomes know to which group particular patients were assigned. Of course, this is difficult to achieve in a psychotherapy trial. Yet a fair alternative is a psychotherapy trial in which patients and those who refer them are blind to the nature of the different treatments, and in which an effort is made to communicate credible positive expectations about the comparison control group.

Conclusion: A lack of blinding seriously biases this study toward finding a positive effect for the intervention, regardless of whether the intervention has any active, effective component.

2. A claim that this is a randomized controlled trial depends on the adequacy of the control offered by the comparison group, enhanced routine care. Just what is being controlled by the comparison? In evaluating a psychological treatment, it’s important that the comparison/control group offers the same frequency and intensity of contact, positive expectations, attention and support. This trial decidedly did not.

 There were large differences between the intervention and control conditions in the amount of contact time. Patients assigned to the cognitive therapy condition received an additional 9 group sessions with a psychiatrist of 3.5 hour duration, plus the option of even more consultations. The over 30 hours of contact time with a psychiatrist should be very attractive to patients who wanted it and could not otherwise obtain it. For some, it undoubtedly represented an opportunity to have someone to listen to their complaints of pain and suffering in a way that had not previously happened. This is also more than the intensity of psychotherapy typically offered in clinical trials, which is closer to 10 to 15, 50-minute sessions.

The intervention group thus received substantially more support and contact time, which was delivered with more positive expectations. This wealth of nonspecific factors favoring the intervention group compromises an effort to disentangle the specific effects of any active ingredient in the CBT intervention package. From what has been said so far, the trials’ providing a fair and generalizable evaluation of the CBT intervention is nigh impossible.

Conclusion: This is a methodologically poor choice of control groups with the dice loaded to obtain a positive effect for CBT.

3.The primary outcomes, both as originally scored and after switching, are subjective self-report measures that are highly responsive to nonspecific treatments, alleviation of mild depressive symptoms and demoralization. They are not consistently related to objective changes in functioning. They are particularly problematic when used as outcome measures in the context of an unblinded clinical trial within an inadequate control group.

There have been consistent demonstrations that assigning patients to inert treatments and measuring the outcomes with subjective measures may register improvements that will not correspond to what would be found with objective measures.

For instance, a provocative New England Journal of Medicine study showed that sham acupuncture as effective as an established medical treatment – an albuterol inhaler – for asthma when judged with subjective measures, but there was a large superiority for the established medical treatment obtained with objective measures.

There have been a number of demonstrations that treatments such as the one offered in the present study to patient populations similar to those in the study produce changes in subjective self-report that are not reflected in objective measures.

Much of the improvement in primary outcomes occurred before the first assessment after baseline and not very much afterwards. The early response is consistent with a placebo response.

The study actually included one largely unnoticed objective measure, utilization of routine care. Presumably if the CBT was effective as claimed, it would have produced a significant reduction in healthcare utilization. After all, isn’t the point of this trial to demonstrate that CBT can reduce health-care utilization associated with (as yet) medically unexplained symptoms? Curiously, utilization of routine care did not differ between groups.

The combination of the choice of subjective outcomes, unblinded nature of the trial, and poorly chosen control group bring together features that are highly likely to produce the appearance of positive effects, without any substantial benefit to the functioning and well-being of the patients.

Conclusion: Evidence for the efficacy of a CBT package for somatic complaints that depends solely on subjective self-report measures is unreliable, and unlikely to generalize to more objective measures of meaningful impact on patients’ lives.

4. We need to take into account the inexplicably high rates of deterioration in both groups, but particularly in the control group receiving enhanced care.

There was an unexplained deterioration of 50% deterioration in the control group and 25% in the intervention group. Rates of deterioration are only given a one-sentence mention in the article, but deserve much more attention. These rates of deterioration need to qualify and dampen any generalizable clinical interpretation of other claims about outcomes attributed to the CBT. We need to keep in mind that the clinical trials cannot determine how effective treatments are, but only how different a treatment is from a control group. So, an effect claimed for a treatment and control can largely or entirely come from deterioration in the control group, not what the treatment offers. The claim of success for CBT probably largely depends on the deterioration in the control group.

One interpretation of this trial is that spending an extraordinary 30 hours with a psychiatrist leads to only half the deterioration experienceddoing nothing more than routine care. But this begs the question of why are half the patients left in routine care deteriorating in such a large proportion. What possibly could be going on?

Conclusion: Unexplained deterioration in the control group may explain apparent effects of the treatment, but both groups are doing badly.

5. The diagnosis of “functional somatic symptoms” or, as the authors prefer – Severe Bodily Distress Syndromes – is considered by the authors to be a psychiatric diagnosis. It is not accepted as a valid diagnosis internationally. Its validation is limited to the work done almost entirely within the author group, which is explicitly labeled as “preliminary.” This biased sample of patients is quite heterogeneous, beyond their physicians having difficulty managing them. They have a full range of subjective complaints and documented physical conditions. Many of these patients would not be considered primarily having a psychiatric disorder internationally and certainly within the US, except where they had major depression or an anxiety disorder. Such psychiatric disorders were not an exclusion criteria.

Once sent on the pathway to a psychiatric diagnosis by their physicians’ making a referral to the study, patients had to meet additional criteria:

To be eligible for participation individuals had to have a chronic (i.e. of at least 2 years duration) bodily distress syndrome of the severe multi-organ type, which requires functional somatic symptoms from at least three of four bodily systems, and moderate to severe impairment.in daily living.

The condition identified in the title of the article is not validated as a psychiatric diagnosis. Two papers to which the authors refer to their  own studies ( 1 , 2 ) from a single sample. The title of one of these papers makes a rather immodest claim:

Fink P, Schröder A. One single diagnosis, bodily distress syndrome, succeeded to capture 10 diagnostic categories of functional somatic syndromes and somatoform disorders. Journal of Psychosomatic Research. 2010 May 31;68(5):415-26.

In neither the two papers nor the present RCT is there sufficient effort to rule out a physical basis for the complaints qualifying these patients for a psychiatric diagnosis. There is also a lack of follow-up to see if physical diagnoses were later applied.

Citation patterns of these papers strongly suggest  the authors are not having got much traction internationally. The criteria of symptoms from three out of four bodily systems is arbitrary and unvalidated. Many patients with known physical conditions would meet these criteria without any psychiatric diagnosis being warranted.

The authors relate what is their essentially homegrown diagnosis to functional somatic syndromes, diagnoses which are themselves subject to serious criticism. See for instance the work of Allen Frances M.D., who had been the chair of the American Psychiatric Association ‘s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) Task Force. He became a harsh critic of its shortcomings and the failures of APA to correct coverage of functional somatic syndromes in the next DSM.

Mislabeling Medical Illness As Mental Disorder

Unless DSM-5 changes these incredibly over inclusive criteria, it will greatly increase the rates of diagnosis of mental disorders in the medically ill – whether they have established diseases (like diabetes, coronary disease or cancer) or have unexplained medical conditions that so far have presented with somatic symptoms of unclear etiology.

And:

The diagnosis of mental disorder will be based solely on the clinician’s subjective and fallible judgment that the patient’s life has become ‘subsumed’ with health concerns and preoccupations, or that the response to distressing somatic symptoms is ‘excessive’ or ‘disproportionate,’ or that the coping strategies to deal with the symptom are ‘maladaptive’.

And:

 “These are inherently unreliable and untrustworthy judgments that will open the floodgates to the overdiagnosis of mental disorder and promote the missed diagnosis of medical disorder.

The DSM 5 Task force refused to adopt changes proposed by Dr. Frances.

Bad News: DSM 5 Refuses to Correct Somatic Symptom Disorder

Leading Frances to apologize to patients:

My heart goes out to all those who will be mislabeled with this misbegotten diagnosis. And I regret and apologize for my failure to be more effective.

The chair of The DSM Somatic Symptom Disorder work group has delivered a scathing critique of the very concept of medically unexplained symptoms.

Dimsdale JE. Medically unexplained symptoms: a treacherous foundation for somatoform disorders?. Psychiatric Clinics of North America. 2011 Sep 30;34(3):511-3.

Dimsdale noted that applying this psychiatric diagnosis sidesteps the quality of medical examination that led up to it. Furthermore:

Many illnesses present initially with nonspecific signs such as fatigue, long before the disease progresses to the point where laboratory and physical findings can establish a diagnosis.

And such diagnoses may encompass far too varied a group of patients for any intervention to make sense:

One needs to acknowledge that diseases are very heterogeneous. That heterogeneity may account for the variance in response to intervention. Histologically, similar tumors have different surface receptors, which affect response to chemotherapy. Particularly in chronic disease presentations such as irritable bowel syndrome or chronic fatigue syndrome, the heterogeneity of the illness makes it perilous to diagnose all such patients as having MUS and an underlying somatoform disorder.

I tried making sense of a table of the additional diagnoses that the patients in this study had been given. A considerable proportion of patients had physical conditions that would not be considered psychiatric problems in the United States.. Many patients could be suffering from multiple symptoms not only from the conditions, but side effects of the medications being offered. It is very difficult to manage multiple medications required by multiple comorbidities. Physicians from the community found their competence and ability to spend time with these patients taxing.

table of functional somatic symptoms

Most patients had a diagnosis of “functional headaches.” It’s not clear what this designation means, but conceivably it could include migraine headaches, which are accompanied by multiple physical complaints. CBT is not an evidence-based treatment of choice for functional headaches, much less migraines.

Over a third of the patients had irritable bowel syndrome (IBS). A systematic review of the comorbidity  of irritable bowel syndrome concluded physical comorbidity is the norm in IBS:

The nongastrointestinal nonpsychiatric disorders with the best-documented association are fibromyalgia (median of 49% have IBS), chronic fatigue syndrome (51%), temporomandibular joint disorder (64%), and chronic pelvic pain (50%).

In the United States, many patients and specialists would consider considering irritable bowel syndrome as a psychiatric condition offensive and counterproductive. There is growing evidence that irritable bowel syndrome is a disturbance in the gut microbiota. It involves a gut-brain interaction, but the primary direction of influence is of the disturbance in the gut on the brain. Anxiety and depression symptoms are secondary manifestations, a product of activity in the gut influencing the nervous system.

Most of the patients in the sample had a diagnosis of fibromyalgia and over half of all patients in this study had a diagnosis of chronic fatigue syndrome.

Other patients had diagnosable anxiety and depressive disorders, which, particularly at the lower end of severity, are responsive to nonspecific treatments.

Undoubtedly many of these patients, perhaps most of them, are demoralized by not been able to get a  diagnosis for what they have good basis to believe is a medical condition, aside from the discomfort, pain, and interference with their life that they are experiencing. They could be experiencing a demoralization secondary to physical illness.

These patients presented with pain, fatigue, general malaise, and demoralization. I have trouble imagining how their specific most pressing concerns could be addressed in group settings. These patients pose particular problems for making substantive clinical interpretation of outcomes that are highly general and subjective.

Conclusion: Diagnosing patients with multiple physical symptoms as having a psychiatric condition is highly controversial. Results will not generalize to countries and settings where the practice is not accepted. Many of the patients involved in the study had recognizable physical conditions, and yet they are being shunted to psychiatrists who focused only on their attitude towards the symptoms. They are being denied the specialist care and treatments that might conceivably reduce the impact of their conditions on their lives

6. The “CBT” offered in this study is as part of a complex, multicomponent treatment that does not resemble cognitive behavior therapy as it is practiced in the United States.

it is thoughtAs seen in figure 1 in the article, The multicomponent intervention is quite complex and consists of more than cognitive behavior therapy. Moreover, at least in the United States, CBT has distinctive elements of collaborative empiricism. Patients and therapist work together selecting issues on which to focus, developing strategies, with the patients reporting back on efforts to implement them. From the details available in the article, the treatment sounded much more like an exhortation or indoctrination, even arguing with the patients, if necessary. An English version available on the web of the educational material used in initial sessions confirmed a lot of condescending pseudoscience was presented to convince the patients that their problems were largely in their heads.

Without a clear application of learning theory, behavioral analysis, or cognitive science, the “CBT”  treatment offered in this RCT has much more in common with the creative novation therapy offered by Hans Eysenck, which is now known to have been justified with fraudulent data. Indeed,  the educational materials  for this study to what is offered in Eysenck’s study reveal striking similarities. Eysenck was advancing the claim that his intervention could prevent cardiovascular disease and cancer and overcome the iatrogenic effects. I know, this sounds really crazy, but see my careful documentation elsewhere.

Conclusion: The embedding of an unorthodox “CBT” in a multicomponent intervention in this study does not allow isolating any specific, active component ofCBT that might be at work.

7. The investigators disclose having altered their scoring of their primary outcome years after the trial began, and probably after a lot of outcome data had been collected.

I found a casual disclosure in the method section of this article unsettling, particularly noting that the original trial registration was:

We found an unexpected moderate negative correlation of the physical and mental component summary measures, which are constructed as independent measures. According to the SF-36 manual, a low or zero correlation of the physical and mental components is a prerequisite of their use.23 Moreover, three SF-36 scales that contribute considerably to the PCS did not fulfil basic scaling assumptions.31 These findings, together with a recent report of problems with the PCS in patients with physical and mental comorbidity,32 made us concerned that the PCS would not reliably measure patients’ physical health in the study sample. We therefore decided before conducting the analysis not to use the PCS, but to use instead the aggregate score as outlined above as our primary outcome measure. This decision was made on 26 February 2009 and registered as a protocol change at clinical trials. gov on 11 March 2009. Only baseline data had been analysed when we made our decision and the follow-up data were still concealed.

Switching outcomes, particularly after some results are known, constitutes a serious violation of best research practices and leads to suspicion of the investigators refining their hypotheses after they had peeked at the data. See How researchers dupe the public with a sneaky practice called “outcome switching”.

The authors had originally proposed a scoring consistent with a very large body of literature. Dropping the original scoring precludes any direct comparison with this body of research, including basic norms. They claim that they switched scoring because two key subscales were correlated in the opposite direction of what is reported in the larger literature. This is troubling indication that something has gone terribly wrong in authors’ recruitment of a sample. It should not be pushed under the rug.

The authors claim that they switched outcomes based only on examining of baseline data from their study. However, one of the authors, Michael Sharpe is also an author on the controversial PACE trial  A parallel switch was made to the scoring of the subjective self-reports in that trial. When the data were eventually re-analyzed using the original scoring, any positive findings for the trial were substantially reduced and arguably disappeared.

Even if the authors of the present RCT did not peekat their outcome data before deciding to switch scoring of the primary outcome, they certainly had strong indications from other sources that the original scoring would produce weak or null findings. In 2009, one of the authors, Michael Sharpe had access to results of a relevant trial. What is called the FINE trial had null findings, which affected decisions to switch outcomes in the PACE trial. Is it just a coincidence that the scoring of the outcomes was then switched for the present RCT?

Conclusion: The outcome switching for the present trial  represents bad research practices. For the trial to have any credibility, the investigators should make their data publicly available so these data could be independently re-analyzed with the original scoring of primary outcomes.

The senior author’s clinic

 I invite readers to take a virtual tour of the website for the senior author’s clinical services  ]. Much of it is available in English. Recently, I blogged about dubious claims of a health care system in Detroit achieving a goal of “zero suicide.” . I suggested that the evidence for this claim was quite dubious, but was a powerful advertisement for the health care system. I think the present report of an RCT can similarly be seen as an infomercial for training and clinical services available in Denmark.

Conflict of interest

 No conflict of interest is declared for this RCT. Under somewhat similar circumstances, I formally complained about undeclared conflicts of interest in a series of papers published in PLOS One. A correction has been announced, but not yet posted.

Aside from the senior author’s need to declare a conflict of interest, the same can be said for one of the authors, Michael Sharpe.

Apart from the professional and reputational interest, (his whole career has been built making strong claims about such interventions) Sharpe works for insurance companies, and publishes on the subject. He declared a conflict of interest for the for PACE trial.

MS has done voluntary and paid consultancy work for government and for legal and insurance companies, and has received royalties from Oxford University Press.

Here’s Sharpe’s report written for the social benefits reinsurance company UnumProvident.

If results of this are accepted at face, they will lend credibility to the claims that effective interventions are available to reduce social disability. It doesn’t matter that the intervention is not effective. Rather persons receiving social disability payments can be disqualified because they are not enrolled in such treatment.

Effects on the credibility of Cochrane collaboration report

The switched outcomes of the trial were entered into a Cochrane systematic review, to which primary care health professionals look for guidance in dealing with a complex clinical situation. The review gives no indication of the host of problems that I exposed here. Furthermore, I have glanced at some of the other trials included and I see similar difficulties.

I been unable to convince the Cochrane to clean up conflicts of interest that are attached to switched outcomes being entered in reviews. Perhaps some of my readers will want to approach Cochrane to revisit this issue.
I think this post raises larger issues about whether Cochrane has any business conducting and disseminating reviews of such a bogus psychiatric diagnosis, medically unexplained symptoms. These reviews do patients no good, and may sidetrack them from getting the medical care they deserve. The reviews do serve the interest of special interests, including disability insurance companies.

Special thanks to John Peters and to Skeptical Cat for their assistance with my writing this blog. However, I have sole responsibility for any excesses or distortions.

 

Trusted source? The Conversation tells migraine sufferers that child abuse may be at the root of their problems

Patients and family members face a challenge obtaining credible, evidence-based information about health conditions from the web.

Migraine sufferers have a particularly acute need because their condition is often inadequately self-managed without access to best available treatment approaches. Demoralized by the failure of past efforts to get relief, some sufferers may give up consulting professionals and desperately seek solutions on Internet.

A lot of both naïve and exploitative quackery that awaits them.

Even well-educated patients cannot always distinguish the credible from the ridiculous.

One search strategy is to rely on websites that have proven themselves as trusted sources.

The Conversation has promoted itself as such a trusted source, but its brand is tarnished by recent nonsense we will review concerning the role of child abuse in migraines.

Despite some excellent material that has appeared in other articles in The Conversation, I’m issuing a reader’s advisory:

exclamation pointThe Conversation cannot be trusted because this article shamelessly misinforms migraine sufferers that child abuse could be at the root of their problems.

The Conversation article concludes with a non sequitur that shifts sufferers and their primary care physicians away from getting consultation with the medical specialists who are most able to improve management of a complex condition.

 

The Conversation article tells us:

Within a migraine clinic population, clinicians should pay special attention to those who have been subjected to maltreatment in childhood, as they are at increased risk of being victims of domestic abuse and intimate partner violence as adults.

That’s why clinicians should screen migraine patients, and particularly women, for current abuse.

This blog post identifies clickbait, manipulation, misapplied buzz terms, and  misinformation – in the The Conversation article.

Perhaps the larger message of this blog post is that persons with complex medical conditions and those who provide formal and informal care for them should not rely solely on what they find on the Internet. This exercise specifically focusing on The Conversation article serves to demonstrate this.

Hopefully, The Conversation will issue a correction, as they promise to do at the website when errors are found.

We are committed to responsible and ethical journalism, with a strict Editorial Charter and codes of conduct. Errors are corrected promptly.

The Conversation article –

Why emotional abuse in childhood may lead to migraines in adulthood

clickbaitA clickbait title offered a seductive  integration of a trending emotionally laden social issue – child abuse – with a serious medical condition – migraines – for which management is often not optimal. A widely circulating estimate is that 60% of migraine sufferers do not get appropriate medical attention in large part because they do not understand the treatment options available and may actually stop consulting physicians.

Some quick background about migraine from another, more credible source:

Migraines are different from other headaches. People who suffer migraines other debilitating symptoms.

  • visual disturbances (flashing lights, blind spots in the vision, zig zag patterns etc).
  • nausea and / or vomiting.
  • sensitivity to light (photophobia).
  • sensitivity to noise (phonophobia).
  • sensitivity to smells (osmophobia).
  • tingling / pins and needles / weakness / numbness in the limbs.

Persons with migraines differ greatly among themselves in terms of the frequency, intensity, and chronicity of their symptoms, as well as their triggers for attacks.

Migraine is triggered by an enormous variety of factors – not just cheese, chocolate and red wine! For most people there is not just one trigger but a combination of factors which individually can be tolerated. When these triggers occur altogether, a threshold is passed and a migraine is triggered. The best way to find your triggers is to keep a migraine diary. Download your free diary now!

Into The Conversation article: What is the link between emotional abuse and migraines?

Without immediately providing a clicklink so that  readers can check sources themselves, The Conversation authors say they are drawing on “previous research, including our own…” to declare there is indeed an association between past abuse and migraines.

Previous research, including our own, has found a link between experiencing migraine headaches in adulthood and experiencing emotional abuse in childhood. So how strong is the link? What is it about childhood emotional abuse that could lead to a physical problem, like migraines, in adulthood?

In invoking the horror of childhood emotional abuse, the authors imply that they are talking about something infrequent – outside the realm of most people’s experience.  If “childhood emotional abuse” is commonplace, how could  it be horrible and devastating?

In their pursuit of click bait sensationalism, the authors have only succeeded in trivializing a serious issue.

A minority of people endorsing items concerning past childhood emotional abuse actually currently meet criteria for a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress disorder. Their needs are not met by throwing them into a larger pool of people who do not meet these criteria and making recommendations based on evidence derived from the combined group.

Spiky_Puffer_Fish_Royalty_Free_Clipart_Picture_090530-025255-184042The Conversation authors employ a manipulative puffer fish strategy [1 and  2 ] They take what is a presumably infrequent condition and  attach horror to it. But they then wildly increase the presumed prevalence by switching to a definition that arises in a very different context:

Any act or series of acts of commission or omission by a parent or other caregiver that results in harm, potential for harm, or threat of harm to a child.

So we are now talking about ‘Any act or series of acts? ‘.. That results in ‘harm, potential for harm or threat’? The authors then assert that yes, whatever they are talking about is indeed that common. But the clicklink to support for this claim takes the reader behind a pay wall where a consumer can’t venture without access to a university library account.

Most readers are left with the authors’ assertion as an authority they can’t check. I have access to a med school library and I checked. The link is  to a secondary source. It is not a systematic review of the full range of available evidence. Instead, it is a  selective search for evidence favoring particular speculations. Disconfirming evidence is mostly ignored. Yet, this article actually contradicts other assertions of The Conversation authors. For instance, the paywalled article says that there is actually little evidence that cognitive behavior therapy is effective for people whose need for therapy is only because they  reported abuse in early childhood.

Even if you can’t check The Conversation authors’ claims, know that adults’ retrospective of childhood adversity are not particularly reliable or valid, especially studies relying on checklist responses of adults to broad categories, as this research does.

When we are dealing with claims that depend on adult retrospective reports of childhood adversity, we are dealing with a literature with seriously deficiencies. This literature grossly overinterprets common endorsement of particular childhood experiences as strong evidence of exposure to horrific conditions. This literature has a strong confirmation bias. Positive findings are highlighted. Negative findings do not get cited much. Serious limitations in methodology and inconsistency and findings generally ignored.

[This condemnation is worthy of a blog post or two itself. But ahead I will provide some documentation.]

The Conversation authors explain the discrepancy between estimates based on administrative data of one in eight children suffering abuse or neglect before age 18 versus much higher estimates from retrospective adult reports on the basis of so much abuse going unreported.

The discrepancy may be because so many cases of childhood abuse, particularly cases of emotional or psychological abuse, are unreported. This specific type of abuse may occur within a family over the course of years without recognition or detection.

This could certainly be true, but let’s see the evidence. A lack of reporting could also indicate a lack of many experiences reaching a threshold prompting reporting. I’m willing to be convinced otherwise, but let’s see the evidence.

The link between emotional abuse and migraines

The Conversation authors provide links only to their own research for their claim:

While all forms of childhood maltreatment have been shown to be linked to migraines, the strongest and most significant link is with emotional abuse. Two studies using nationally representative samples of older Americans (the mean ages were 50 and 56 years old, respectively) have found a link.

The first link is to an article that is paywalled except for its abstract. The abstract shows  the study does not involve a nationally representative sample of adults. The study compared patients with tension headaches to patients with migraines, without a no-headache control group. There is thus no opportunity to examine whether persons with migraines recall more emotional abuse than persons who do not suffer headaches.  Any significant associations in a huge sample disappeared after controlling for self-reported depression and anxiety.

My interpretation: There is nothing robust here. Results could be due to crude measurement, confounding of retrospective self-report by current self-report anxious or depressive symptoms. We can’t say much without a no-headache control group.

The second of the authors’ studies is also paywalled, but we can see from the abstract:

We used data from the Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) study, which included 17,337 adult members of the Kaiser Health Plan in San Diego, CA who were undergoing a comprehensive preventive medical evaluation. The study assessed 8 ACEs including abuse (emotional, physical, sexual), witnessing domestic violence, growing up with mentally ill, substance abusing, or criminal household members, and parental separation or divorce. Our measure of headaches came from the medical review of systems using the question: “Are you troubled by frequent headaches?” We used the number of ACEs (ACE score) as a measure of cumulative childhood stress and hypothesized a “dose–response” relationship of the ACE score to the prevalence and risk of frequent headaches.

Results — Each of the ACEs was associated with an increased prevalence and risk of frequent headaches. As the ACE score increased the prevalence and risk of frequent headaches increased in a “dose–response” fashion. The risk of frequent headaches increased more than 2-fold (odds ratio 2.1, 95% confidence interval 1.8-2.4) in persons with an ACE score ≥5, compared to persons with and ACE score of 0. The dose–response relationship of the ACE score to frequent headaches was seen for both men and women.

The Conversation authors misrepresent this study. It is about self-reported headaches, not the subgroup of these patients reporting migraines. But in the first of their own studies they just cited, the authors contrast tension headaches with migraine headaches, with no controls.

So the data did not allow examination of the association between adult retrospective reports of childhood emotional abuse and migraines. There is no mention of self-reported depression and anxiety, which wiped out any relationship with childhood adversity in headaches in the first study. I would expect that a survey of ACES would include such self-report. And the ACEs equate either parental divorce and separation (the same common situation likely occur together and so are counted twice) with sexual abuse in calculating an overall score.

The authors make a big deal of the “dose-response” they found. But this dose-response could just represent uncontrolled confounding  – the more ACEs indicates the more confounding, greater likelihood that respondents faced other social, person, economic, and neighborhood deprivations.  The higher the ACE score, the greater likelihood that other background characteristic s are coming into play.

The only other evidence the authors cite is again another one of their papers, available only as a conference abstract. But the abstract states:

Results: About 14.2% (n = 2,061) of the sample reported a migraine diagnosis. Childhood abuse was recalled by 60.5% (n =1,246) of the migraine sample and 49% (n = 6,088) of the non-migraine sample. Childhood abuse increased the chances of a migraine diagnosis by 55% (OR: 1.55; 95% CI 1.35 – 1.77). Of the three types of abuse, emotional abuse had a stronger effect on migraine (OR: 1.52; 95% CI 1.34 – 1.73) when compared to physical and sexual abuse. When controlled for depression and anxiety, the effect of childhood abuse on migraine (OR: 1.32; 95% CI 1.15 – 1.51) attenuated but remained significant. Similarly, the effect of emotional abuse on migraine decreased but remained significant (OR: 1.33; 95% CI 1.16 – 1.52), when controlled for depression and anxiety.

The rates of childhood abuse seem curiously high for both the migraine and non-migraine samples. If you dig a bit on the web for details of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, you can find how crude the measurement is.  The broad question assessing emotional abuse covers the full range of normal to abnormal situations without distinguishing among them.

How often did a parent or other adult caregiver say things that really hurt your feelings or made you feel like you were not wanted or loved? How old were you the first time this happened? (Emotional abuse).

An odds ratio of 1.33 is not going to attract much attention from an epidemiologist, particularly when it is obtained from such messy data.

I conclude that the authors have made only a weak case for the following statement: While all forms of childhood maltreatment have been shown to be linked to migraines, the strongest and most significant link is with emotional abuse.

Oddly, if we jump ahead to the closing section of The Conversation article, the authors concede:

Childhood maltreatment probably contributes to only a small portion of the number of people with migraine.

But, as we will  see, they make recommendations that assume a strong link has been established.

Why would emotional abuse in childhood lead to migraines in adulthood?

This section throws out a number of trending buzz terms, strings them together in a way that should impress and intimidate consumers, rather than allow them independent evaluation of what is being said.

got everything

The section also comes below a stock blue picture of the brain.  In web searches, the picture  is associated with social media where the brain is superficially brought into  in discussions where neuroscience is  not relevant.

An Australian neuroscientist commented on Facebook:

Deborah on blowing brains

The section starts out:

The fact that the risk goes up in response to increased exposure is what indicates that abuse may cause biological changes that can lead to migraine later in life. While the exact mechanism between migraine and childhood maltreatment is not yet established, research has deepened our understanding of what might be going on in the body and brain.

We could lost in a quagmire trying to figuring out the evidence for the loose associations that are packed into a five paragraph section.  Instead,  I’ll make some observations that can be followed up by interested readers.

The authors acknowledge that no mechanism has been established linking migraines and child maltreatment. The link for this statement takes the reader to the authors own pay walled article that is explicitly labeled “Opinion Statement ”.

The authors ignore a huge literature that acknowledges great heterogeneity among sufferers of migraines, but points to some rather strong evidence for treatments based on particular mechanisms identified among carefully selected patients. For instance, a paper published in The New England Journal of Medicine with well over 1500 citations:

Goadsby PJ, Lipton RB, Ferrari MD. Migraine—current understanding and treatment. New England Journal of Medicine. 2002 Jan 24;346(4):257-70.

Speculations concerning the connections between childhood adversity, migraines and the HPA axis are loose. The Conversation authors their obviousness needs to be better document with evidence.

For instance, if we try to link “childhood adversity” to the HPA axis, we need to consider the lack of specificity of” childhood adversity’ as defined by retrospective endorsement of Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs). Suppose we rely on individual checklist items or cumulative scores based on number of endorsements. We can’t be sure that we are dealing with actual rather than assumed exposure to traumatic events or that there be any consistent correlates in current measures derived from the HPA axis.

Any non-biological factor defined so vaguely is not going to be a candidate for mapping into causal processes or biological measurements.

An excellent recent Mind the Brain article by my colleague blogger Shaili Jain interviews Dr. Rachel Yehuda, who had a key role in researching HPA axis in stress. Dr. Yehuda says endocrinologists would cringe at the kind of misrepresentations that are being made in The Conversation article.

A recent systematic review concludes the evidence for specific links between child treatment and inflammatory markers is of limited and poor quality.

Coelho R, Viola TW, Walss‐Bass C, Brietzke E, Grassi‐Oliveira R. Childhood maltreatment and inflammatory markers: a systematic review. Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica. 2014 Mar 1;129(3):180-92.

The Conversation article misrepresents gross inconsistencies in the evidence of biological correlates representing biomarkers. There are as yet no biomarkers for migraines in the sense of a biological measurement that reliably distinguishes persons with migraines from other patient populations with whom they may be confused. See an excellent funny blog post by Hilda Bastian.

Notice the rhetorical trick in authors of The Conversation article’s assertion that

Migraine is considered to be a hereditary condition. But, except in a small minority of cases, the genes responsible have not been identified.

Genetic denialists like Oliver James  or Richard Bentall commonly phrased questions in this manner to be a matter of hereditary versus non-hereditary. But complex traits like height, intelligence, or migraines involve combinations of variations in a number of genes, not a single gene or even a few genes.. For an example of the kind of insights that sophisticated genetic studies of migraines are yielding see:

Yang Y, Ligthart L, Terwindt GM, Boomsma DI, Rodriguez-Acevedo AJ, Nyholt DR. Genetic epidemiology of migraine and depression. Cephalalgia. 2016 Mar 9:0333102416638520.

The Conversation article ends with some signature nonsense speculation about epigenetics:

However, stress early in life induces alterations in gene expression without altering the DNA sequence. These are called epigenetic changes, and they are long-lasting and may even be passed on to offspring.

Interested readers can find these claims demolished in Epigenetic Ain’t Magic by PZ Myers, a biologist who attempts to rescue an extremely important development concept from its misuse.

Or Carl Zimmer’s Growing Pains for Field of Epigenetics as Some Call for Overhaul.

What does this mean for doctors treating migraine patients?

The Conversation authors startle readers with an acknowledgment that contradicts what they have been saying earlier in their article:

Childhood maltreatment probably contributes to only a small portion of the number of people with migraine.

It is therefore puzzling when they next say:

But because research indicates that there is a strong link between the two, clinicians may want to bear that in mind when evaluating patients.

Cognitive behavior therapy is misrepresented as an established effective treatment for migraines. A recent systematic review and meta-analysis  had to combine migraines with other chronic headaches and order to get ten studies to consider.

The conclusion of this meta-analysis:

Methodology inadequacies in the evidence base make it difficult to draw any meaningful conclusions or to make any recommendations.

The Conversation article notes that the FDA has approved anti-epileptic drugs such as valproate and topiramate for treatment of migraines. However, the article’s claim that the efficacy of these drugs are due to their effects on epigenetics is quite inconsistent with what is said in the larger literature.

Clinicians specializing and treating fibromyalgia or irritable bowel syndrome would be troubled by the authors’ lumping these conditions with migraines and suggesting that a psychiatric consultation is the most appropriate referral for patients who are having difficulty achieving satisfactory management.

See for instance the links contained in my blog post, No, irritable bowel syndrome is not all in your head.

The Conversation article closes with:

Within a migraine clinic population, clinicians should pay special attention to those who have been subjected to maltreatment in childhood, as they are at increased risk of being victims of domestic abuse and intimate partner violence as adults.

That’s why clinicians should screen migraine patients, and particularly women, for current abuse.

It’s difficult to how this recommendation is relevant to what has preceded it. Routine screening is not evidence-based.

The authors should know that the World Health Organization formerly recommended screening primary care women for intimate abuse but withdrew the recommendation because of a lack of evidence that it improved outcomes for women facing abuse and a lack of evidence that no harm was being done.

I am sharing this blog post with the authors of The Conversation article. I am requesting a correction from The Conversation. Let’s see what they have to say.

Meanwhile, patients seeking health information are advised to avoid The Conversation.

Hans Eysenck’s contribution to cognitive behavioral therapy for physical health problems: fraudulent data

  • The centenary of the birth of Hans Eysenck is being marked by honoring his role in bringing clinical psychology to the UK and pioneering cognitive behavior therapy (CBT).
  • There is largely silence about his publishing fraudulent data, editorial misconduct, and substantial undeclared conflicts of interest.
  • The articles in which Eysenck used fraudulent data are no longer cited much, but the influence of his claims which depended on these data remains profound.
  • Eysenck used fraudulent data to argue that CBT could prevent cancer and cardiovascular disease and extend the lives of persons with advanced cancer.
  • He similarly used fraudulent data to advance the claim that psychoanalysis is, unlike smoking, carcinogenic and has other adverse effects on health.
  • Ironically, Eysenck incorporated into his explanations for how CBT works elements of the psychoanalytic thinking that he seemingly detested.

If there is sufficient interest, a follow-up blog post will discuss:

  • Because of Eysenck’s influence, CBT in the UK exaggerates the role of early childhood adversity and much less to functional behavioral analysis than the American behavior therapy and cognitive behavior therapy.
  • Both CBT in the UK and some quack therapy approaches make assumptions about mechanism tied to Eysenck’s use of fraudulent data.
  • Consistent with Eysenck’s influence, CBT for physical problems in the UK largely focuses on self-report questionnaire assessments of mechanism of change and of outcome, rather than functional behavioral and objective physical health outcome variables.

8th-chocolate-happy-birthday-cake-for-HansHappy Birthday, Hans Eysenck

March 12, 2016 was the centenary of the birth of psychologist Hans Eysenck. The British Psychological Society’s  The Psychologist marked the occasion with release of a free app by which BPS members can access a collection of articles about Hans Eysenck from the archives.  Nonmembers can access the articles here.

The introduction to the collection, Philip Corr’s The centenary of a maverick states

Eysenck’s contributions were many, varied and significant, including: the professional development of clinical psychology; the slaying of the psychoanalytical dragon; pioneering behaviour therapy and, thus, helping to usher in the era of cognitive behavioural therapy…

Corr also wrote in the March 30 2016 Times Higher Education:

in defence corr

hans ensenck portraitThe articles collected in The Psychologist were written over many years. Together they present an unflattering picture of a controversial man who was shunned by his colleagues, blocked from getting awards, and who would humiliate those with whom he disagreed rather than acknowledge any contradictory evidence. Particularly revealing are Roderick Buchanan’s   Looking back: The controversial Hans Eysenck and a review of Buchanan’s book by Eysenck’s son Michael, Playing with fire: The controversial career of Hans J. Eysenck.

However, the collection stops short of acknowledging what was revealed in the early 90s in The BMJ: Eysenck knowingly published fraudulent data to back outrageous claims that CBT prevented cancer and extended the lives of patients with terminal cancer, whereas psychoanalysis was carcinogenic. He published his claims in journals he had founded, liberally self-plagiarizing and duplicate publishing with undeclared conflicts of interest. Eysenck received salary supplements and cash awards from German tobacco companies and from lawyers for the American tobacco companies for these activities.

slide 2 r smith should editors slide1 R Smith EysenckThe BMJ gave psychiatrists Anthony Pelosi and Louis Appleby a forum in the early nineties for criticizing Eysenck, even though the articles they attacked had been published elsewhere. The BMJ Editor Richard Smith followed up,  citing Eysenck as an example in raising the question whether editors should publish research articles in their own journal. Pelosi filed formal charges against Eysenck with the British Psychological Society. But, according to Buchanan’s book:

The BPS investigatory committee deemed it “inappropriate” to set up an investigatory panel to look into the material Pelosi had sent them, and henceforth considered the matter closed. Pelosi disagreed, of course, but was left with little recourse.

In an editorial in The Times Simon Wessely acknowledged Pelosi and Appleby’s criticism of Eysenck, but said “It would take more than a couple of psychiatrists to ruffle Eysenck.”

Simon on EysenckWessely suggested that the matter be dropped: the controversy was distracting everyone from the real progress being made in psychological approaches to cancer, like showing a fighting spirit extends the lives of cancer patients.  There was apparently no further mention in the UK press. Read more here.

Eysenck’s articles involving fraudulent data are seldom cited in the contemporary literature, but the claims the data were used to back remain quite influential. For instance, Eysenck claimed psychological factors presented more risk for cancer than many well-established biological factors. Including Eysenck’s data probably allowed one of the most cited meta-analyses of psychological factors in cancer to pass the threshold of hazard ratios strong enough for publication in the prestigious journal, Nature Clinical Practice: Oncology. Without the inclusion of Eysenck’s data, hazard ratios from methodologically weak studies cluster slightly higher than 1.0, suggesting little association that cannot be explained by confounds. A later blog post will document the broader influence of the Eysenck fraud on psychoneuroimmunology.

Eysenck’s claims concerning effects of CBT on physical health conditions now similarly go uncited.  However, the idiosyncratic definition he gave to CBT and his claims about the presumed mechanism by which it improved physical health pervade both CBT as defined in the UK and a number of quack treatments in the UK and elsewhere.

It is important to establish the connection between fraudulent data, distinctive features of CBT in the UK, and presumed mechanisms of action in order to open for re-examination the forms that CBT for physical health problems take in the UK and the way in which claims of efficacy are evaluated.

Fraudulent Data

Eysenck repeated tables and text in a number of places, but I will mainly draw on data as he presented them in the journal he founded, Behaviour Research and Therapy [1,   2], which correspond with what he presents elsewhere.

Eysenck’s Croatian collaborator Grossarth-Maticek conducted the therapy and collected the predictor and outcome data. A personality inventory  was used to classify participants receiving therapy into four types , a cancer-prone type (Type 1), a coronary heart disease (CHD)-prone type (Type 2), and 2 healthy types (Type 3 and Type 4). The typology was derived from quadrants in a 2×2 dichotomization of high versus low and rationality versus anti-emotionality, quite different from the dimensions and item content of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. Indeed, Roderick Buchanan noted in his biography that “Eysenck had struggled to banish typological concepts in favour of continuous dimensions for most of his career.” Grossarth-Maticekis questionnaire and typology has been sharply criticized later by Eysenck son Michael, among many others.

Eysenck and Grossarth-Maticek reported results of individually delivered “creative novation behaviour therapy”:

… Effects of prophylactic behaviour therapy on the cancer-prone and the CHD-prone probands respectively after 13 yr. It will be clear that treatment by means of creative novation behaviour therapy has had a highly significant prophylactic effect, preventing deaths from cancer in probands of Type 1, and death from coronary heart disease in probands of Type 2.

table 3 prophylactic effectsFor creative novation behaviour therapy delivered in a group format:

It will be seen that both cancer and CHD mortality are very significantly higher in the control group, as is death from other causes. Incidence rates are also very significantly higher in the control group for cancer, but with a difference below our selected P = 0.01 level of significance for CHD. Most telling is the difference regarding those ‘still living’-79.9% in the therapy group, 23.9% in the control group. The results of the group therapy study support those of the individual therapy group in demonstrating the value of behaviour therapy in preventing death from cancer and CHD, and in lowering the incidence from cancer and possibly from CHD.

table 4 group therapyStrong effects were reported even when the treatment was delivered as a discussion of a brief pamphlet. The companion paper  described this bibliotherapy and provided the pamphlet as an appendix,  which is reproduced here.

This statement is given to the proband, who also receives an introductory 1-hr treatment in which the meaning of the statement is explained, application considered, and likely advantages discussed. After the patient has been given time to consider the statement, and apply it to his/her own problems, the therapist spends a further 3-5 hr with the patient, suggesting specific applications of the principles in the statement to the needs of the patient, and his/her particular circumstances.

Six hundred probands received the bibliotherapy and a control group of 500 matched for personality type, smoking, age and sex received no treatment. Another 100 matched patients received a placebo condition in which they met with interviewers to discuss a pamphlet with “psychoanalytic explanation and suggestions.”

I encourage readers to take a look at the pamphlet, which is less than a page long. It ends with:

The most important aims of autonomous self-activation: your aim should always be to produce conditions would make it possible for you to lead a happy and contented life.

The results were:

There are no statistically significant differences between the control group and the placebo group, which may therefore be combined and considered a single control group. Compared with this control group, the treatment group fared significantly better. In the control group, 128 died of cancer, 176 of CHD; in the treatment group only 27 died of cancer, and 47 of CHD. For ‘death from other causes’, the figures are 192 and 115. Clearly the bibliographic method had a very strong prophylactic effect.

table 5 group and biblioEysenck and Grossarth-Maticek reported numerous other studies, including one in which 24 matched pairs of patients with inoperable cancer were assigned to either creative novation behaviour therapy or a control group. The patients receiving the behaviour therapy lived five years versus the three years of those in the control group, a difference which was highly significant.

Keep in mind that in these studies that all of the creative novation behaviour therapy sessions were solely provided by Grossarth-Maticek.

But let’s jump to a final in a series of tables constructed to make the argument that psychoanalysis was harmful to physical health.

We are here dealing with three groups. Group I is constituted of patients who terminated their  psychoanalytical treatment after 2 yr or less, and were then treated with behaviour therapy.

Group 2 is a control group matched with the members of group I on age, sex, smoking and personality type. Group 3 is a control group which discontinued psychoanalysis, like Group I, but did not receive behaviour therapy. Members of Group I and 2 do not differ significantly in mortality, but Group 3 has significantly greater mortality than either. Looking again at the percentage of patients still living, we find for Group 1 92, 95 and 95%, for Group 2 96, 89 and 95%, for Group 3 the figures are: 72, 63 and 61%. Clearly behaviour therapy can reverse the negative impact psychoanalysis has on survival.

table 15 psychoanalysisIn a number of places, this is explained in identical words:

Theoretically, this conclusion is not unreasonable. We have shown that stress is a powerful factor in causing cancer and CRD, and it is widely agreed, even among psychoanalysts, that their treatment imposes a considerable strain on patients. The hope is often expressed that finally the treatment will resolve these strains, but there is no evidence to suggest that this is true (Rachman & Wilson, 1980; Eysenk & Martin, 1987). Indeed, there is good evidence that even in cases of mental disorder psychoanalysis often does considerable harm (Mays & Franks, 1985). A theoretical model to account for these negative outcomes of psychoanalysis and psychotherapy generally has been presented elsewhere (Eysenck, 1985); it would apply equally well in the psychosomatic as in the purely psychiatric field.

dog breakfastCBT for physical health problems: a dog’s breakfast approach

Grossarth-Maticek had already formulated his approach and delivered all psychotherapy before Eysenck began co-authored papers and promoting him. In a 1982 article without Eysenck as an author, Grossarth-Maticek is quite explicit about the psychoanalytic theory behind his approach:

A central proposition of our research program is that cancer patients are either preoccupied with traumatic events of early childhood or with excessive expectations of the parents during their whole life. They are characterized by intensive internal inhibitions toward expressing feelings and desires. Therefore, we speak of a chronic blockade of expression of feelings and desires. We assume that parents of cancer patients did not respond adequately to the child’s cries for help and these children were obliged very early to do non-conforming daily task. Cancer patients have never learned to express persistent cries for help…

The specific family dynamics in the special educational pattern which block hysterical reactions determine the behavior, which in turn is characterized by excessive persistence of performance of the daily task, disregard of symptoms and lack of aggressiveness in behavior. Through the currents of negative life events (i.e., death of closely connected persons) expressions of loneliness and reactive depression can appear intensively and chronically.

If this is not clear enough:

In our approach we try not to deny the psycho analytic propositions but to integrate the psychoanalytic research program with social psychological and sociological factors, hereby assuming that they have interactive effects on carcinogenesis.

Strangely, Grossarth-Maticek suggests in this article, that the psychoanalytic factors interact with “organic risk factors such as cigarette smoking in the case of lung cancer.” Grossarth-Maticek and Eysenck would soon be receiving tens of thousands of dollars in support from the German tobacco companies and lawyers from the American tobacco companies to promote the idea that personality caused smoking and lung cancer, but any connection between smoking and lung cancer was spurious. Product liability suits against tobacco companies should therefore be dismissed.

In the articles co-authored by Grossarth-Maticek and Eysenck, these roots of what Eysenck repackaged as creative novation behaviour therapy are only hinted at, but are noticeable to the observant reader in references to the role of dependency and autonomy. Fraudulent data are mustered to show the powerful positive effects of this behaviour therapy versus the toxicity of psychoanalysis.

On page 8 of this article, ten  explicitly labeled behavioural techniques are identified as occurring across individual, group, and bibliotherapy:

  • Training for reduction of the planned behaviors initiation of autonomous behavior.
  • Training for cognitive alteration under conditions of relaxation
  • Training for alternative reactions.
  • Training for the integration of cognition, emotionality and intuition.
  • Training to achieve stable expression of feelings.
  • Training for potentiating social behavioral control
  • Training to suppress stress-creating ideas
  • Training to achieve a behavior-directing hierarchic value structure
  • Training in the suppression of stress-creating thought.
  • Abolition of dependence reactions.

This approach has only superficial resemblance to American behavioral therapy and CBT. The emphasis on expression of emotional feelings and abolition of dependent reactions is incomprehensible when it is detached from its psychoanalytic roots. The paper refers to behavioral analysis, but interviews about the past, including childhood experiences are emphasized, rather than applied behavioral analysis. The hierarchies of behavior do not correspond to operant approaches, but to a value structure of autonomy versus dependence.

There is also considerable reference to the use of hypnosis to achieve these goals.

In short, neither the goals nor the methods have much relationship to learning theory at the time that Eysenck was writing nor to contemporary developments in operant conditioning. His approach is a tortured extension of classical conditioning. Outside of the fraudulent data that Grossarth-Maticek developed and that he published with Eysenck, there is little basis for assuming that psychological factors were related to physical health in the way the treatment approach postulated.

It should be kept in mind that Eysenck was not a psychotherapist. He actually detested psychotherapy and generated considerable controversy earlier by arguing that any apparent effects of psychotherapy were due to natural remission. It should also be noted that Eysenck was claiming creation novation behaviour therapy modified personality traits, even when delivered in a brief pamphlet, in ways that could not be anticipated by his other writings about personality. Finally, the particular personality characteristics that Eysenck was talking about modifying were very different than what he assessed with the Eysenck Personality Inventory.

Only “controversial” and “too good to be true” or fraud?

 Before Eysenck began collaborating with Grossarth-Maticek, there was widespread doubts about the validity of Grossarth-Maticek’s work.  In 1973, Grossarth-Maticek’s work had been submitted to the University of Heidelberg as a Habilitation, a second doctoral degree required for a full professorship. It was rejected. One member of the committee, Manfred Amelung, declared the results “too good to be true.” He retained a copy and would later put his knowledge of its details into a devastating critique. According to Buchanan’s biography, Eysenck demanded of Grossarth-Maticek “you must let me check your data, for if you deceive me I will never forgive you.”

Eysenck gained access to the data set, sometimes directing reanalyses by Grossarth-Maticek and his statistician. Other analyses were done by Eysenck’s statisticians in London. Eysenck’s biographer Buchanan noted “there were ample opportunities to select, tease out, or redirect attention – given a data set that was apparently sprawling chaotic but rich and ambitious….From the mid-1980s, Eysenck did virtually all of the writing for publication in English and presumably exerted a strong editorial control.” Buchanan also notes that tobacco companies became skeptical of the strength of findings that were reported, but also their inconsistency. They refused to continue to support Eysenck unless an independent team was set up to check analyses and the conclusions that Eysenck was drawing from them.

Eysenck single-authored a target article for Psychological Inquiry that reproduced many of the tables that we have been discussing. More than a dozen commentators included the members of the independent team, but also others who did not have access to the data, but who examined the tables with forensic attention. The commentary started off with Manfred Manfred Amelung who made use of what he had learned from Grossarth-Maticek’s doctoral work.

Many of the commentators suggested that the intervention studies presented conclusions that were “too good to be true,” not only in terms of the efficacy claim for the intervention, but for the negative outcomes claimed for the control group. But other commentators pointed to gross inconsistencies across different reports in terms of methods and results, clear evidence of manipulation of data, including some patients being counted a number of times, other patients dying twice, Eysenck and Grossarth-Maticek’s improbable ability to obtain matching of intervention patients and controls, and too perfect predictions. In the end, even Grossarth-Maticek’s Heidelberg statistician expressed concerns that there had been tampering with the data.

Both Grossarth-Maticek and Eysenck got opportunities to respond and were defensive and dismissive of the overwhelming evidence of exaggeration of the results and even fraud.

The exchanges in Psychological Inquiry occurred over two issues. Taken together, the critical commentaries are devastating, but the criticisms became diffuse because commentators focused on different problems. It took a more succinct, pithy critique by Anthony Pelosi and Louis Appleby in The BMJ to bring the crisis of credibility to a head.

Anthony Pelosi and Louis Appleby in The BMJ

 In the first round of their two-part attack, Pelosi and Appleby centered on Eysenck and Grossarth-Maticek’s  two articles in Behaviour Research and Therapy, but referenced the critiques in Psychological Inquiry. The incredible effectiveness of these two psychiatrists depended largely on their pointing  out what was hiding in plain sight in the two Behaviour Research and Therapy articles. For instance:

After 13 years, 16 of 50 untreated type 1 subjects had died of a carcinoma. Not one of the 50 cancer prone subjects receiving the psychotherapy died of cancer. The therapy was a genuine panacea, giving equivalent results for type 2 subjects and heart disease. The all cause mortality was over 60% in untreated and 15% in treated subjects. The death rate in the untreated subjects was truly alarming as they began the trial healthy and most were between 40 and 60 years of age.

I encourage readers to compare the Pelosi and Appleby paper to the tables I presented here and see what they missed.

Pelosi and Appleby calculated the effort required by Grossarth-Maticek if he had – as Eysenck insisted- single-handedly carried out all of the treatment.

It is striking that all the individual and group therapy was given by Professor Grossarth-Maticek. The trials were undertaken between 1972 and 1974 and involved 96 subjects (or perhaps 192 subjects, see below) in at least 20 hours of individual work, and at least 10 groups (245 subjects with 20-25 in each) for six to 15 sessions each. Add to this Grossarth-Maticek’s explanatory introduction to bibliotherapy for 600 people, and it can be seen that the amount of time spent by this single senior academic on his experimental psychotherapies is huge and certainly unprecedented.

They summarized inconsistencies and contradictions reported in the Psychological Inquiry, but then added their own observation that a matching of 192 pairs of intervention and control patients had only produced a sample of 192! They suggested that in the two Behaviour Research and Therapy articles there were at least  “10 elaborate misprints or misstatements in the description of the methods” that the editor or reviewers should have caught.

At no point, does the word “fraud” or “fraudulent” appear in Pelosi and Appleby’s first article. Rather, they suggest that  “Eysenck and Grossarth-Maticek… are:

making claims which, if correct, would make creative novation therapy a vital part of public health policy throughout the world.”

They conclude with

For these reasons there should be a total reexamination and proper analysis of the original data from this research in an attempt to answer the questions listed above. The authors give their address as the Institute of Psychiatry in London, which must be concerned about protecting its reputation. Therefore the institute should, in our view, assist in this clarification of the meaning of the various studies. There should also be some stern questions asked of the editors of the various journals involved, especially those concerned among the editorial staff of Behaviour Research and Therapy who, in our opinion, have done a disservice to their scientific disciplines, and indeed to Professors Eysenck and Grossarth-Maticek, in allowing this ill considered presentation of research on such a serious topic.

Eysenck’s reply and Pelosi and Appleby’s response

 Readers can consult Eysenck’s reply  for themselves, but it strikes me as evasive and dismissive. Specific criticisms are not directly answered, but Eysenck points to consistency between his results and those of David Spiegel, who had claimed to get even stronger effects in his small study of supportive expressive therapy for women with metastatic breast cancer. Rather than demolishing the credibility of his work with Grossarth-Maticek, Eysenck argues that Pelosi and Appleby only point to the need for funding of a replication. Eysenck closes with:

Their critical review, however incorrect, full of errors and misunderstandings, and lacking in objectivity, may have been useful in drawing attention to a large body of work, of both scientific and social relevance, that has been overlooked for too long.

Pelosi and Appleby took Eysenck’s reply as an opportunity to get even more specific in the criticisms:

We are accused of being vague in mentioning many errors, inappropriate analyses, and missing details in the publications on this research programme. We value this opportunity to be more specific, to clarify just a few of the questions raised by ourselves and others, which Eysenck has failed to answer, and to outline additional findings from these authors’ investigations.

After a detailed reply, they wrap up with references to the criticisms that Eysenck received in Psychological Inquiry, in an ironic note, turning Eysenck’s attacks on proponents of the link between smoking and lung cancer on to Eysenck himself:

Our concern has been to clarify the methods and analyses of a body of research which, if accurate, would profoundly influence public health policies on cancer and heart disease. Other critics have been more challenging in what they have alleged, and in our opinion the controversy which now surrounds one of academic psychology’s most influential figures constitutes a crisis for the subject itself. The seriousness of the detailed allegations by van der Ploeg, although refuted by Eysenck and Grossarth-Maticek, should in themselves prompt these authors to reexamine their own findings after appropriate further training in the methodology of medical research. Perhaps the most skilfully worded criticism on this subject was made not about Eysenck but by him in a debate on the relation between smoking and cancer. In disputing the findings of Doll and Hill’s epidemiological studies on this association he comments: “What we have found are serious methodological weaknesses in the design of the studies quoted in favour of these theories, statistical errors, and unsubstantiated extrapolations from dubious data to unconfirmed conclusions.” Eysenck owes it to himself and to his discipline to reconsider critically his own work on this subject.

In the over 20 years since this exchange, Pelosi and Appleby and their ally editor Richard Smith of The BMJ failed to get an appropriate response from the British Psychological Society, King’s College London or the Institute of Psychiatry, the journal Behaviour Research and Therapy, or the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE). This situation demonstrates the inability of British academia to correct bad and even fraudulent science. It stands as a cautionary note to those of us now attempting to correct what we perceive as bad science. Efforts are likely to be futile. On the other hand, the editorship of Behaviour Research and Therapy has passed to an American, Michelle Craske, a professor at UCLA. Perhaps she can be persuaded to make a long overdue correction to the scientific record and remove a serious blemish on the credibility of that Journal.

If there is sufficient interest, I will survey the profound influence of the fraudulent work of Eysenck and Grossarth-Maticek in a future blog post.

  • Because of their influence, CBT in the UK gives an exaggerated emphasis to early childhood adversity and much less to functional behavioural analysis than the American behavior therapy and CBT.
  • Consistent with Eysenck’s influence, CBT for physical problems in the UK largely focuses on self-report questionnaire assessments of mechanism of change and of outcome, rather than functional behavioral and objective physical health outcome variables.

Influences can also be seen in:

Contemporary CBT for physical conditions as practiced in UK, including CBT for irritable bowel syndrome (IBS), fibromyalgia, and other “all in the head” conditions that are deemed Medically Unexplained Symptoms (MUS) in the UK, as in PRINCE trial of Trudie Chalder and Simon Wessely.

The “psychosomatic” approach as seen in neurologist Suzanne O’Sullivan’s  recent editorial in The Lancet and her “It’s All in Your Head”, which won the 2016 Wellcome Book Award and her.

Quack treatments, such as Phil Parker’s Lightning Process, which the UK’s Advertising Standards Authority (ASA) ruled against advertising its effectiveness in treatment of chronic fatigue syndrome/ myalgic Encephalopathy,  multiple sclerosis, and irritable bowel syndrome/digestive issues. The Lightning Process is nonetheless implemented in the UK NHS under the direction of University of Bristol Professor Esther Crawley 

Quack cancer treatments such as Simonton visualization method.

More mainstream, but unproven psychological treatments for cancer including David Spiegel’s supportive expressive therapy. Neither Spiegel –nor anyone else– has ever been able to replicate the finding praised by Eysenck, but repeats his claims in a recent non-peer reviewed article in the UK-based Psycho-Oncology and with a closely related article in BPS’ British Journal of Health Psychology.

More mainstream, but unproven psychological approaches to cancer that claim to improve immune functioning by reducing stress.

Some Scottish readers will understand this message concerning Eysenck’s fraud: The ice cream man cometh.

My usual disclaimer: All views that I express are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of PLOS or other institutional affiliations.

Is risk of Alzheimer’s Disease reduced by taking a more positive attitude toward aging?

Unwarranted claims that “modifiable” negative beliefs cause Alzheimer’s disease lead to blaming persons who develop Alzheimer’s disease for not having been more positive.

Lesson: A source’s impressive credentials are no substitute for independent critical appraisal of what sounds like junk science and is.

More lessons on how to protect yourself from dodgy claims in press releases of prestigious universities promoting their research.

If you judge the credibility of health-related information based on the credentials of the source, this article  is a clear winner:

Levy BR, Ferrucci L, Zonderman AB, Slade MD, Troncoso J, Resnick SM. A Culture–Brain Link: Negative Age Stereotypes Predict Alzheimer’s Disease Biomarkers. Psychology and Aging. Dec 7 , 2015, No Pagination Specified. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/pag0000062

alzheimers
From INI

As noted in the press release from Yale University, two of the authors are from Yale School of Medicine, another is a neurologist at Johns Hopkins School of Medicine, and the remaining three authors are from the US National Institute on Aging (NIA), including NIA’s Scientific Director.

The press release Negative beliefs about aging predict Alzheimer’s disease in Yale-led study declared:

“Newly published research led by the Yale School of Public Health demonstrates that                   individuals who hold negative beliefs about aging are more likely to have brain changes associated with Alzheimer’s disease.

“The study suggests that combatting negative beliefs about aging, such as elderly people are decrepit, could potentially offer a way to reduce the rapidly rising rate of Alzheimer’s disease, a devastating neurodegenerative disorder that causes dementia in more than 5 million Americans.

The press release posited a novel mechanism:

“We believe it is the stress generated by the negative beliefs about aging that individuals sometimes internalize from society that can result in pathological brain changes,” said Levy. “Although the findings are concerning, it is encouraging to realize that these negative beliefs about aging can be mitigated and positive beliefs about aging can be reinforced, so that the adverse impact is not inevitable.”

A Google search reveals over 40 stories about the study in the media. Provocative titles of the media coverage suggest a children’s game of telephone or Chinese whispers in which distortions accumulate with each retelling.

Negative beliefs about aging tied to Alzheimer’s (Waltonian)

Distain for the elderly could increase your risk of Alzheimer’s (FinancialSpots)

Lack of respect for elderly may be fueling Alzheimer’s epidemic (Telegraph)

Negative thoughts speed up onset of Alzheimer’s disease (Tech Times)

Karma bites back: Hating on the elderly may put you at risk of Alzheimer’s (LA Times)

How you feel about your grandfather may affect your brain health later in life (Men’s Health News)

Young people pessimistic about aging more likely to develop Alzheimer’s later on (Health.com)

Looking forward to old age can save you from Alzheimer’s (Canonplace News)

If you don’t like old people, you are at higher risk of Alzheimer’s, study says (RedOrbit)

If you think elderly people are icky, you’re more likely to get Alzheimer’s (HealthLine)

In defense of the authors of this article as well as journalists, it is likely that editors added the provocative titles without obtaining approval of the authors or even the journalists writing the articles. So, let’s suspend judgment and write off sometimes absurd titles to editors’ need to establish they are offering distinctive coverage, when they are not necessarily doing so. That’s a lesson for the future: if we’re going to criticize media coverage, better focus on the content of the coverage, not the titles.

However, a number of these stories have direct quotes from the study’s first author. Unless the media coverage is misattributing direct quotes to her, she must have been making herself available to the media.

Was the article such an important breakthrough offering new ways in which consumers could take control of their risk of Alzheimer’s by changing beliefs about aging?

No, not at all. In the following analysis, I’ll show that judging the credibility of claims based on the credentials of the sources can be seriously misleading.

What is troubling about this article and its well-organized publicity effort is that information is being disseminated that is misleading and potentially harmful, with the prestige of Yale and NIA attached.

Before we go any further, you can take your own look at a copy of the article in the American Psychological Association journal Psychology and Aging here, the Yale University press release here, and a fascinating post-publication peer review at PubPeer that I initiated as peer 1.

Ask yourself: if you encountered coverage of this article in the media, would you have been skeptical? If so what were the clues?

spoiler aheadcure within The article is yet another example of trusted authorities exploiting entrenched cultural beliefs about the mind-body connection being able to be harnessed in some mysterious way to combat or prevent physical illness. As Ann Harrington details in her wonderful book, The Cure Within, this psychosomatic hypothesis has a long and checkered history, and gets continually reinvented and misapplied.

We see an example of this in claims that attitude can conquer cancer. What’s the harm of such illusions? If people can be led to believe they have such control, they are set up for blame from themselves and from those around them when they fail to fend off and control the outcome of disease by sheer mental power.

The myth of “fighting spirit” overcoming cancer that has survived despite the accumulation of excellent contradictory evidence. Cancer patients are vulnerable to blaming themselves for being blamed by loved ones when they do not “win” the fight against cancer. They are also subject to unfair exhortations to fight harder as their health situation deteriorates.

onion composite
                                                        From the satirical Onion

 What I saw when I skimmed the press release and the article

  • The first alarm went off when I saw that causal claims were being made from a modest sized correlational study. This should set off anyone’s alarms.
  • The press release refers to this as a “first ever” d discussion section of the article refer to this as a “first ever” study. One does not seek nor expect to find robust “first ever” discoveries in such a small data set.
  • The authors do not provide evidence that their key measure of “negative stereotypes” is a valid measure of either stereotyping or likelihood of experiencing stress. They don’t even show it is related to concurrent reports of stress.
  • Like a lot of measures with a negative tone to items, this one is affected by what Paul Meehl calls the crud factor. Whatever is being measured in this study cannot be distinguished from a full range of confounds that not even being assessed in this study.
  • The mechanism by which effects of this self-report measure somehow get manifested in changes in the brain lacks evidence and is highly dubious.
  • There was no presentation of actual data or basic statistics. Instead, there were only multivariate statistics that require at least some access to basic statistics for independent evaluation.
  • The authors resorted to cheap statistical strategies to fool readers with their confirmation bias: reliance on one tailed rather than two-tailed tests of significance; use of a discredited backwards elimination method for choosing control variables; and exploring too many control/covariate variables, given their modest sample size.
  • The analyses that are reported do not accurately depict what is in the data set, nor generalize to other data sets.

The article

The authors develop their case that stress is a significant cause of Alzheimer’s disease with reference to some largely irrelevant studies by others, but depend on a preponderance of studies that they themselves have done with the same dubious small samples and dubious statistical techniques. Whether you do a casual search with Google scholar or a more systematic review of the literature, you won’t find stress processes of the kind the authors invoke among the usual explanations of the development of the disease.

Basically, the authors are arguing that if you hold views of aging like “Old people are absent-minded” or “Old people cannot concentrate well,” you will experience more stress as you age, and this will accelerate development of Alzheimer’s disease. They then go on to argue that because these attitudes are modifiable, you can take control of your risk for Alzheimer’s by adopting a more positive view of aging and aging people

The authors used their measure of negative aging stereotypes in other studies, but do not provide the usual evidence of convergent  and discriminant validity needed to establish the measure assesses what is intended. Basically, we should expect authors to show that a measure that they have developed is related to existing measures (convergent validity) in ways that one would expect, but not related to existing measures (discriminate validity) with which it should have associations.

Psychology has a long history of researchers claiming that their “new” self-report measures containing negatively toned items assess distinct concepts, despite high correlations with other measures of negative emotion as well as lots of confounds. I poked fun at this unproductive tradition in a presentation, Negative emotions and health: why do we keep stalking bears, when we only find scat in the woods?

The article reported two studies. The first tested whether participants holding more negative age stereotypes would have significantly greater loss of hippocampal volume over time. The study involved 52 individuals selected from a larger cohort enrolled in the brain-neuroimaging program of the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging.

Readers are given none of the basic statistics that would be needed to interpret the complex multivariate analyses. Ideally, we would be given an opportunity to see how the independent variable, negative age stereotypes, is related to other data available on the subjects, and so we could get some sense if we are starting with some basic, meaningful associations.

Instead the authors present the association between negative age stereotyping and hippocampal volume only in the presence of multiple control variables:

Covariates consisted of demographics (i.e., age, sex, and education) and health at time of baseline-age-stereotype assessment, (number of chronic conditions on the basis of medical records; well-being as measured by a subset of the Chicago Attitude Inventory); self-rated health, neuroticism, and cognitive performance, measured by the Benton Visual Retention Test (BVRT; Benton, 1974).

Readers get cannot tell why these variables and not others were chosen. Adding or dropping a few variables could produce radically different results. But there are just too many variables being considered. With only 52 research participants, spurious findings that do not generalize to other samples are highly likely.

I was astonished when the authors announced that they were relying on one-tailed statistical tests. This is widely condemned as unnecessary and misleading.

Basically, every time the authors report a significance level in this article, you need to double the number to get what is obtained with a more conventional two-tailed test. So, if they proudly declare that results are significant p = .046, then the results are actually (non)significant, p= .092. I know, we should not make such a fuss about significance levels, but journals do. We’re being set up to be persuaded the results are significant, when they are not by conventional standards.

So the authors’ accumulating sins against proper statistical techniques and transparent reporting: no presentation of basic associations; reporting one tailed tests; use of multivariate statistics inappropriate for a sample that is so small. Now let’s add another one, in their multivariate regressions, the authors relied on a potentially deceptive backwards elimination:

Backward elimination, which involves starting with all candidate variables, testing the deletion of each variable using a chosen model comparison criterion, deleting the variable (if any) that improves the model the most by being deleted, and repeating this process until no further improvement is possible.

The authors assembled their candidate control/covariate variables and used a procedure that checks them statistically and drop some from consideration, based on whether they fail to add to the significance of the overall equation. This procedure is condemned because the variables that are retained in the equation capitalize on chance. Particular variables that could be theoretically relevant are eliminated simply because they fail to add anything statistically in the context of the other variables being considered. In the context of other variables, these same discarded variables would have been retained.

The final regression equation had fewer control/covariates then when the authors started. Statistical significance will be calculated on the basis of the small number of variables remaining, not the number that were picked over and so results will artificially appear stronger. Again, potentially quite misleading to the unwary reader.

The authors nonetheless concluded:

As predicted, participants holding more-negative age stereotypes, compared to those holding more-positive age stereotypes, had a significantly steeper decline in hippocampal volume

The second study:

examined whether participants holding more negative age stereotypes would have significantly greater accumulation of amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles.

The outcome was a composite-plaques-and-tangles score and the predictor was the same negative age stereotypes measure from the first study. These measurements were obtained from 74 research participants upon death and autopsy. The same covariates were used in stepwise regression with backward elimination. Once again, the statistical test was one tailed.

Results were:

As predicted, participants holding more-negative age stereotypes, compared to those holding more-positive age stereotypes, had significantly higher composite-plaques-and-tangles scores, t(1,59) = 1.71 p = .046, d = 0.45, adjusting for age, sex, education, self-rated health, well-being, and number of chronic conditions.

Aha! Now we see why the authors commit themselves to a one tailed test. With a conventional two-tailed test, these results would not be significant. Given a prevailing confirmation bias, aversion to null findings, and obsession with significance levels, this article probably would not have been published without the one tailed test.

The authors’ stirring overall conclusion from the two studies:

By expanding the boundaries of known environmental influences on amyloid plaques, neurofibrillary tangles, and hippocampal volume, our results suggest a new pathway to identifying mechanisms and potential interventions related to Alzheimer’s disease

pubpeerPubPeer discussion of this paper [https://pubpeer.com/publications/16E68DE9879757585EDD8719338DCD ]

Comments accumulated for a couple of days on PubPeer after I posted some concerns about the first study. All of the comments were quite smart, some directly validated points that I been thinking about, but others took the discussion in new directions either statistically or because the commentators knew more about neuroscience.

Using a mechanism available at PubPeer, I sent emails to the first author of the paper, the statistician, and one of the NIA personnel inviting them to make comments also. None have responded so far.

Tom Johnstone, a commentator who exercise the option of identifying himself noted the reliance on inferential statistics in the absence of reporting basic relationships. He also noted that the criterion used to drop covariates was lax. Apparently familiar with neuroscience, he expressed doubts that the results had any clinical significance or relevance to the functioning of the research participants.

Another commentator complained of the small sample size, use of one tailed statistical tests without justification, the “convoluted list of covariates,” and “taboo” strategy for selecting covariates to be retained in the regression equation. This commentator also noted that the authors had examined the effect of outliers, conducting analyses both with and without the inclusion of the most extreme case. While it didn’t affect the overall results, exclusion dramatically change the significance level, highlighting the susceptibility of such a small sample to chance variation or sampling error.

Who gets the blame for misleading claims in this article?

dr-luigi-ferrucciThere’s a lot of blame to go around. By exaggerating the size and significance of any effects, the first author increases the chance of publication and also further funding to pursue what is seen as a “tantalizing” association. But it’s the job of editors and peer reviewers to protect the readership from such exaggerations and maybe to protect the author from herself. They failed, maybe because exaggerated findings are consistent with the journal‘s agenda of increasing citations by publishing newsworthy rather than trustworthy findings. The study statistician, Martin Slade obviously knew that misleading, less than optimal statistics were used, why didn’t he object? Finally, I think the NIA staff, particularly Luigi Ferrucci, the Scientific Director of NIA  should be singled out for the irresponsibility of attaching their names to such misleading claims. Why they do so? Did they not read the manuscript?  I will regularly present instances of NIH staff endorsing dubious claims, such as here. The mind-over-disease, psychosomatic hypothesis, gets a lot of support not warranted by the evidence. Perhaps NIH officials in general see this as a way of attracting research monies from Congress. Regardless, I think NIH officials have the responsibility to see that consumers are not misled by junk science.

This article at least provided the opportunity for an exercise that should raise skepticism and convince consumers at all levels – other researchers, clinicians, policymakers, and those who suffer from Alzheimer’s disease and those who care from them – we just cannot sit back and let trusted sources do our thinking for us.